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Whether the setting aside of the windfall 
revenues in various designated trust funds 
was a good idea or not, it was an ad hoc 
reaction to the receipt of the commodity 
boom revenues.
It is certain that Papua New Guinea will 
continue to experience commodity booms 
and slumps because of the high variability 
of global primary commodity prices, and 
when the LNG project comes on-line, 
the PNG government’s share of resource 
revenue flows and fluctuations will increase 
significantly.
Therefore, it is very important for 
the people of PNG to have an in-depth 
discussion about how future national 
government resource revenues can be 
managed on a consistent, effective basis.
Much of the past discussion of the 
management of the government’s mining, 
oil, and gas revenues has been concerned 
with the holding of the inflows in funds 
and the functioning of these funds as 
mechanisms for the stabilisation of flows 
into the government budget, for sterilising 
the impact of the foreign exchange inflows 
on the country’s exchange rate and other 
There is a need for Papua New Guineans to 
thoroughly discuss the management of the 
government’s share of the mineral, oil, and 
gas revenues. 
Papua New Guinea has experienced two 
major mining booms since independence. As 
noted in the 2009 Pacific Economic Bulletin’s 
economic survey of the PNG economy, the 
first of these booms in the early 1990s was 
managed very poorly, with government 
expenditure greatly exceeding revenues. 
This resulted in a large increase in public 
debt and the devaluation and eventual 
floating of the kina.
The recent commodity boom has been 
managed more effectively, with the paying 
down of public debt and the setting aside 
in trust funds of some of the windfall 
revenues for future expenditure on long-
overdue refurbishment of important public 
infrastructure and development of essential 
services.
Unfortunately, there has been also 
sharply increased recurrent expenditure; and 
currently there is some doubt about how well 
the windfall revenues set aside in trust funds 
have subsequently been managed.
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export and import-competing industries, 
and as a way of saving some, or all, of the 
revenues for future use.
PNG’s Mineral Revenue Stabilisation 
Fund (MRSF) was intended to be used in 
this way but was unable to achieve any of 
these objectives.
However, while good models for the 
design of funds to hold resource revenues 
have been developed, such as the use of 
independent trustees as in the case of the 
Ok Tedi Development Foundation and 
the Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund (which is 
based on Norway’s State Petroleum Fund), 
it is important to note that the primary 
management problem has been with 
the effective expenditure of the resource 
revenues.
It is one thing to have effective control 
over the revenues going into the trust fund, 
but it is quite another thing to spend the 
money effectively. Indeed, the latter has 
been Papua New Guinea’s main problem.
Therefore, a major issue for discussion in 
Papua New Guinea is whether institutional 
arrangements can be devised which will 
ensure that the resource revenues collected 
by the government in the future will be 
spent more effectively.
It is not feasible that the revenues be 
locked away for future use, such as in 
Norway where the State Petroleum Fund is 
to be used to provide incomes for retirees. 
Papua New Guinea has a desperate need 
to see the resource revenues go towards the 
development of its physical and human 
capital (education).
However, if the past is any guide, one 
cannot be optimistic that government 
expenditure of these revenues will deliver 
this result.
The 2010 PNG economic survey lists 
the problems that have been experienced 
in the past in managing resource windfalls 
and raises questions about the relative roles 
of stabilisation, sterilisation, and savings 
in any mechanism that is established, and 
the challenges faced in realising the set 
objectives.
However, these are secondary objectives; 
the major problem faced is how to ensure 
effective use of the resource revenues that 
are received.
Can institutions or mechanisms be 
established which will ensure that there is 
much better government use of the revenue 
inflows than over the past 30 years? 
The management of resource revenues 
in developing countries — and in some 
high-income countries — has not been a 
happy one, with a few exceptions. Waste, 
corruption, macroeconomic instability, civil 
conflict, and distortion of political processes 
have widely accompanied the flows of these 
revenues.
A recent Working Paper from the Center 
for Global Development has argued that 
the reason Botswana (Moss and Young 
2009) — the country with the highest per 
capita growth rate in the world between 
1965 and 1998 — has managed to use the 
large revenues from its diamond exports 
to underpin this growth is because there 
is a strong political constituency (the cattle 
industry) supporting the effective use of 
these revenues.
Chile, Indonesia, and Malaysia are 
also given as examples of countries where 
good use has been made of mineral and oil 
revenues. In these three cases the countries 
had “strong governments” that had a keen 
interest in the widespread development of 
the economy and were able to resist narrow, 
vested interests.
The other interesting cases that the 
Working Paper raises are Alaska and 
Norway. The authors argue that, in these 
cases, the oil and gas revenues are well-
managed because there are also strong 
political constituencies protecting their 
interests.
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In  Norway’s  case  the  pol i t ical 
constituency is the increasing number of 
retirees depending on the good management 
of the Fund.
In Alaska’s case, a Permanent Fund was 
set up to collect revenues from oil exports. 
The Fund must be invested outside Alaska 
and its purpose can only be changed by 
changing the State’s Constitution.
The earnings from the Permanent Fund’s 
investments are distributed quarterly and 
on an equal basis to all Alaskan citizens.
Thus, all citizens have an interest 
in protecting the Fund, and it is said 
that it would be “political suicide” for 
any politician to suggest changes in the 
management of the Fund.
The many examples of developing 
countries that have not been able to manage 
resource revenues effectively are seen as 
not having a political constituency with 
an interest in protecting the revenues from 
corruption, waste, and so on.
Papua New Guinea does not appear to 
have such a constituency.
Is it possible that PNG can develop such 
a constituency?
This question must be answered in 
the affirmative before it can be assumed 
that refinements of the way in which 
resource revenues are made available to 
the government will be viable — such as 
those suggested in the World Bank’s draft 
discussion paper on ‘Managing Resource-
Induced Volatility in Papua New Guinea’ 
(World Bank, 2010).
The implementation of the Alaskan 
model in Papua New Guinea would 
develop a widespread constituency for the 
good management of the invested funds.
It should also develop a stronger public 
interest in government expenditure, as the 
public would be paying taxes in the form 
of value-added tax from its expenditure of 
the dividends.
Where the public has little relationship 
with government revenues, as with 
resource revenues paid directly to the 
government, there is little insistence on 
public accountability. From cross-country 
analysis, a tax-paying public can be expected 
to have a closer interest in how its taxes are 
used.
It is also quite likely that the distribution 
of such funds to all Papua New Guineans 
would lead to increased agricultural and 
rural productivity, which would have flow-
on benefits to the whole economy, as it did in 
the fastgrowing, land-abundant East Asian 
economies such as Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam .
The flow of dividends to the bulk of the 
Papua New Guinean population in the rural 
areas would provide them with access to 
capital that they currently do not have, and 
would give them the capital to develop their 
farming and other informal, cash-earning 
activities.
Early, rapid agricultural productivity 
growth in countries such as Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia laid the basis for 
their sustained, broad-based, economic 
growth.
Would the Alaskan model be technically 
possible in Papua New Guinea?
Given the extensive coverage of mobile 
phones in Papua New Guinea and the 
developing use of mobile phone banking, 
the improved registration of births and 
deaths, and, very significantly, the recently 
amended ILG Act, which provides the 
grassroots with a base for updating details 
of all individuals in a social unit such as a 
clan, the distribution of dividends from an 
invested resources fund looks to be more 
and more feasible. 
I t  could also lead to improved 
information being collected from the Census, 
and improved electoral information. 
Would such a scheme be politically 
possible? Just as with any major reform 
264
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 3 © 2010 the australian national university Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 3 © 2010 the australian national university
— including developing institutions to 
achieve improved government expenditure 
of windfall mining revenues — a political 
“champion” would be needed to bring it 
about.
The Center for Global Development 
paper suggests that the Alaskan model 
provides a model worthy of consideration 
for Ghana, which has recently discovered 
oil and will soon have large inflows of oil 
revenues.
The Alaskan model is also worth 
consideration by Papua New Guinea. It 
is important to note that the payment of 
Fund dividends to all Alaskans has had 
strong benefits for the economy, with people 
saving a large proportion of the quarterly 
payments, which feeds into investment and 
economic growth.
This behaviour contrasts significantly 
with the widespread behaviour of 
developing countries governments’ use of 
resource revenues, which are often used for 
unsustainable recurrent expenditures.
Unfortunately, unsustainable increases 
in recurrent expenditures have occurred 
in Papua New Guinea during its two 
commodity booms since independence.  
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